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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether the loss of a job increases the likelihood of future difficulties on 
the labour market. We study displacement resulting from all plant closures (with ten or more 
employees) in Sweden in 1987 and follow their labor market outcome up to 1999. The control 
group is extracted from a random sample of non-displaced employees by matching on 
propensity scores. We find a rapid and almost total initial recovery of those displaced in 1987 
compared to the control group up to 1990, both with respect to employment and 
unemployment measures. However, with the advent of the deep recession in 1990, the two 
groups again diverge. There is some relative recovery in the mid to late 1990s. However, by 
the end of the 1990s, the echo of the job loss 13 years earlier had still not subsided. We 
attribute the long-term effects as being either due to recurrent loss of match-specific capital or 
statutory seniority lay-offs rules. 
 
 
JEL classification: J63, J64 & J65  
 
Key Words: Plant closure, displaced workers, unemployment scarring, linked employer-
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1 Introduction 
 
Job loss occurs in bursts and may result in a rapid increase in unemployment. However, while 
job loss exhibits no persistence, unemployment generally does. The literature has forwarded a 
number of reasons for the persistence of unemployment. Focus is predominantly placed on 
why those who lose their jobs do not secure new ones. This has been viewed as being due to 
loss of human capital, stigmatisation, welfare incentives, employment protection legislation 
and host of other factors. See, for example, Machin and Manning (1999). Of somewhat less 
prominence in the earlier literature is that even if the displaced does get a new job, the 
probability of also losing the new job may be high. Hall (1995) underlines the potential 
importance of this phenomenon for unemployment persistence. Thus, one may observe 
unemployment persistence resulting from displacement for those who did not even experience 
an initial period of unemployment.  
 
The US literature on the longer-term effects of displacement, see Ruhm (1991), has mainly 
focused on permanent loss of income. Stevens (1997), found that an appreciable part of the longer-term income loss was due to subsequent job loss. Similar “scarring” effects of 
unemployment are also found in the UK. See Arulampalam et al. (2000) and Böheim and 
Taylor (2002). 
 
We examine the post-displacement labour market status of all workers who lost their job in 
1987 due to plant closure in Sweden compared to a control group for 13 years. The control 
group is extracted from a large sample of employees not displaced in 1987 by matching on 
propensity scores. The focus on plant closures (and the availability of rich pre-displacement 
information between 1983 and 1987) permits us with some degree of confidence to exclude 
the possible effect of unobserved heterogeneity being correlated with the probability of 
displacement in 1987. As possible bias due to selection on unobservables is the main 
drawback of the, otherwise eminently suitable, methodology of matching on propensity 
scores, we believe that we have a very appropriate research design, data and econometric 
method. 
 
In the next section we examine the reasons why displaced workers could be expected to have 
a relatively high probability of again experiencing job loss. In contrast to much of the scarring 
literature we focus on the theory of firm specific matches and the stylised fact that most new 
jobs end early. Section 3 shows how we identify the initial displacement, by plant closure, for 
all workers in Sweden in 1987. We also point out that the initial displacement occurred when 
the labour market was exceptionally good and remained so until, four years later, Sweden 
experienced a macroeconomic shock unparalleled since the Great Depression. Section 4 
constructs a matched control group of persons employed in 1986 that did not experience a 
plant closure during 1987 and derives the difference-in-difference matching estimator used to 
identify the effect of displacement on subsequent labour market status. In section 5 we present 
the results in terms of the effect on employment, unemployment and out of the labour force 
for those of ages 20-30, 31-40 and 41-50, at the time of initial displacement. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2 Why an echo? 
 
Why should the effects of job displacement echo over time? This question is of course related 
to the persistence of unemployment, a topic that generated much research, particularly in 
Europe, since the oil shocks of the late 1970s and 1980s. However, as the data in this paper 
clearly shows a rapid initial convergence of the displaced group to the employment and 
unemployment levels of the control group, only to subsequently diverge again during the 
severe recession that started in early 1990, it is natural to focus on explanations of why the 
displaced group was more susceptible to subsequent displacement from the early 1990s and 
onwards than on issues related to an initial unemployment period, such as stigmatisation and 
discouragement. 
 
The most obvious reason why jobs obtained by the group of displaced workers may be 
precarious is quite simply because they were new jobs. Farber (1997) gathers much of the US 
evidence on job stability, stating that; “The central facts regarding worker mobility in modern 
labour markets are clear … (1) long-term employment relationships are common, (2) most 
new jobs end early, and (3) the probability of a job ending declines with tenure”. These three 
facts are empirically inter-related and can all be attributed to “specific job capital”. This term 
encompasses not only that which is commonly equated with firm specific human capital (i.e. 
investment in training) but also the costly acquisition of information that can be termed 
“match specific capital”. 
  
The efficient separations literature, see for example Mortensen (1978), Hall and Lazear 
(1984) and Parssons (1986), shows that displacement occurs when a negative demand or 
  2productivity shock is greater than the firm’s evaluation of specific job capital. As one can 
reasonably assume that firm specific capital, acquired through experience or by training, 
increases with tenure, then displacement will be higher for low relative to high tenure 
employees. 
 
In Jovanovic (1979) job specific capital is related to the informational problems for both 
parties in gauging the quality of the match. The matching process continues even after hiring 
as workers and firms continually reveal and learn more about job and worker quality. In this 
context new jobs end early due to one of the parties learning that the match was bad. As one 
could expect that match quality is revealed relatively early on the job (compared to the time 
taken to acquire significant levels of firm specific human capital in the more traditional 
meaning) matching capital may be a particularly plausible explanation of the extremely large 
number of very short jobs. Moreover, one could propose another search-based explanation for 
these new jobs ending early, as a conceivable strategy for the displaced worker is to take a 
temporary job in order to be able to search for other, better quality, jobs.  
 
However, the Swedish institutional context provides a potentially powerful alternative 
explanation to the match specific capital hypothesis. To our knowledge Sweden is the only 
industrialised country in the world that stipulates seniority rules (last-in first-out) in statutory 
law when displacing labour for economic reasons. In addition, if the employer is to 
subsequently, within a year, re-employ, there is an obligation to first offer employment to the 
previously displaced employees in accordance with seniority. However, the firm and the trade 
unions may negotiate derogations on seniority. While some case studies show that seniority 
rules may be avoided in practice, see for example Calleman (2000), there is no systematic 
evidence.  
 
Moreover, seniority rules at layoff can be viewed as fair in terms of reward for services 
rendered to the firm. This can be seen from a sociological perspective where the group (i.e. 
the work force) may consider that those who have spent many years at the firm may have 
secured a “job right” and should be rewarded by preferential treatment at lay-offs (“the ethics 
of desert”). Elster (1992) find this argument spurious as “to devote one’s life to a task is 
meritorious only when it involves forgoing other activities that should have been more 
satisfying personally”. However, whether spurious or not, the argument appears to be 
persuasive, as shown by empirical research in Rousseau and Anton (1992) and earlier US 
research surveyed therein. 
 
Thus our hypothesis is that the workers displaced in 1987 will be more exposed to subsequent 
risks of job losses compared to similar individuals who did not experience displacement 
during this year. This is simply due to the fact that they have, compared to the matched 
control group, relatively new jobs. This follows from the economic theory of specific job 
capital, but also possibly from Swedish labour law and social norms. We will not be able to 
discriminate between these three potential explanations.  
 
 
3 The labour market 1987-1999 and the definition of displacement in 1987 
 
3.1 The Swedish labour market between 1987 and 1999 
 
The initial job loss occurred in 1987. This was during an exceptionally good period in the 
Swedish labour market. Unemployment had been falling since 1983 and continued down to a 
low of 1.5% in 1989 and employment increased up to a peak in 1990. Indeed, by the end of 
the 1980s, the two basic measures of the state of labour market indicated a more buoyant 
labour market than at any time since 1975. See Figure 1.  
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However, in the early 1990s, Sweden experienced a macroeconomic downturn unparalleled in 
the post-war period. GDP fell by six percent from the cyclical peak in the first quarter of 1990 
to the trough in the first quarter of 1993. By 1993 unemployment had risen to 8.2 percent. 
Total employment fell by 13 percent, close to 600 000 persons, between the first quarters of 
1990 and 1994. After 1994 there was a minor recovery, which soon petered out. Signs of a 
sustained labour market recovery did not appear until the end of the decade. The period from 
1997 and onwards has seen a large decline in unemployment as well as rising employment.
1  
 
Thus, our displaced workers faced a very good labour market for the first four years after 
displacement with ample time and opportunity to find a new job. At the beginning of the 
1990s they faced the most severe recession since the 1930s. From 1997 and onwards there 
was a sustained recovery.  
 
 
3.2 Identification of the closing establishments and displaced workers 
 
The identification of persons who experience an establishment closure is a vital and rather 
unique feature of the data used in this paper and should be clearly defined. While register data 
of acceptable quality on plant closures in Sweden only became available in the mid 1990s, see 
Tegsjö (1995), the new procedures at Statistics Sweden enable us to trace establishments back 
to 1985 and match them to their employees.
2 We identify plant closures in 1987 and 1988 
with at least ten employees.  
 
Statistics Sweden's Business Register (Företagsregistret) is the basic frame for the 
identification of all establishments in both the private and public sectors. The first step in 
determining whether an establishment has closed is to find non-matches between the 
establishment identity number in the Business Register and the obligatory annual payroll tax 
returns, which are submitted by establishment. However, non-matches are only potential 
closures as they may occur due to a change in the identity number due to, for example, a 
change in legal status of the firm, change in ownership, or simply due to errors.
3 An incorrect 
change in the identity number has occurred if any two of the following criteria apply: 1) it has 
the same owner; 2) it has the same geographical location; 3) it conducts the same type of 
economic activity. To assure that this is not the case, Statistics Sweden surveys the firms 
when non-matches occur in multi-establishment firms or in establishments of at least 10 
employees (as is the case in this study). We are, thus, quite convinced that the steps taken 
here vouch for a low risk of over-classification of closed establishments.
4  
 
A plant closure is a process over time and while the procedure above can identify a closure 
and when the process ended, it cannot determine when it began. We set the upper limit for the 
duration of the closure to three years.
5 After careful inspection of each and every closuring 
establishment up to three years prior to closure, we identified a probable duration of the 
closure process. The process was defined to be one, two or three years, based on worker flows 
and establishment size.
6 One should note that while this procedure is hardly perfect, this 
                                                 
1 See Holmlund (2003) for a detailed account of the development of the Swedish labour market during 
this period.  
2 This data was first used in Persson (1999) in a study of job creation and destruction. 
3 Kuhn (2002) recognizes that failing to correct for false deaths, could have a significant impact on the 
results. 
4 For a more detailed description of these surveys and additional criteria, see Appendix B. 
5 In Storrie (1993), at the closure of a large Swedish shipyard (i.e. a sector with a long production 
time), the closure process, from the initiation of negotiations which are mandatory according to the 
Codetermination Act before redundancies may commence, to when the plant was finally closed, was 
just under three years. 
6 The precise ad hoc rules determining the classifications are found in Appendix C. 
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Many US studies on displaced workers use the Displaced Worker Surveys, which identify the 
displaced workers by retrospective survey questions. It is most likely that this kind of survey 
only identifies actual displacements and not the quits due to expectation of closure. See the 
discussion below. Studies using administrative data more similar to the data in this study, 
usually assume (explicitly or implicitly) that the closing process begins and ends in the same 
year. While some allow a two-year process, this is done without an examination of the 
individual processes and all closures are defined as being of two years (Bender, 2002). Using 
such rigid time windows will presumably either over or under classify the displaced workers. 
This problem is highlighted in Kuhn (2002). 
 
According to the classification of the length of the closing process, we then identify the 
workers separating from the establishments. However, we cannot be sure that all these 
separations were in fact due to the observed closure, since we only observe that the worker is 
employed at the establishment in November in year t, and not in November year t+1. There 
are three main possibilities; voluntary quits unrelated to the closure, pre-emptive quits (i.e. 
quits due to expectation of closure) and actual displacements. The last two types of 
separations can be seen as direct consequences of the closure. With a long rigid time-window 
there is a risk of including a large fraction of quits unrelated to the impending closure. When 
applying a short time-window, one will presumably miss a large proportion of pre-emptive 
quits related to the impending closure and possibly some actual displacements. The 
implications are that an over-classification of displaced workers will probably underestimate 
any adverse effects of the displacement, and an under-classification of displaced workers 
leaving early in the closing process will have the opposite effect.
7 The logic behind the latter 
is that, presumably most separations early in the process are pre-emptive quits. We expect 
those workers to have a better labour market situation, than those staying to the bitter end, and 
therefore not affected to the same extent by the closure. The more flexible time-window 
applied in this paper will be a step towards minimizing these problems. 
 
 
3.3 Sample retained for analysis 
 
The flexible three-year-window implies that the year when the job loss occurs will differ 
between displaced workers within the same establishment according to when during the 
closing process the displacement occurs. Our control group is comprised of a random sample 
of 200,000 persons employed in November 1986, who did not experience a closure during the 
same period, i.e. 1987 and 1988. Since one main issue in this paper is to investigate whether 
the displaced workers are more severely hurt by the deep recession in the early 1990’s, it is 
most important that both the study and the control group is selected in the same year, 
otherwise we cannot separate time effects from calendar effects. This requires us to restrict 
the study group retained for analysis to those employed in 1986 and displaced during the 
following year. Thus, no workers displaced during the first year, in a three-year closing 
process, are included. We do believe, though, that this is not a severe problem, since very few 
processes were determined to be three years long, and the corresponding job losers separating 
early in the process were also few. See Eliason and Storrie (2003).   
 
In the estimations we restrict our sample to individuals aged 20-50 years. We also exclude 
those working in the construction sector or a sector not adequately defined, since for these 
sectors the concept of establishment, may be somewhat peculiar, and the identification of 
displaced workers is not considered reliable. Moreover, we use a balanced panel, i.e. all 
individuals are required to be in the sample during the observation period 1983-1999. 
Attrition is very low as it occurs only through emmigration or death. Finally, we exclude all 
                                                 
7 Displaced workers are here defined as both those who actually were dismissed by the employer and 
those who left the establishment in expectation of an impending closure. 
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371 establishments, and 119,241 non-displaced workers remain (see Table 3).  
 
4 Econometric method and empirical implementation 
 
The objective of this paper is to determine whether job displacement has long-term effects on 
labour market status. The main empirical problem is akin to that in the evaluation of labour 
market policy or medical treatment. One can observe the labour market outcome of the 
displaced workers but not the outcome for these workers had they not have been displaced. 
Heckman (1999) provides an overview of much of the literature trying to deal with these 
problems. One such method, originating in medical statistics, is matching on propensity 
scores (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984, and Rosenbaum, 1989). Recently propensity 
score matching has also received increasing attention in economics. See Heckman et al. 
(1997), Dehejia and Wahba (1998), Sianesi (2001), Lechner (2002a), Lechner (2002b) and 
Larsson (2003). 
 
By matching one tries to ex post mimic the randomisation of individuals into the treatment 
group in experimental studies. Intuitively this is a very appealing method, since if the 
displaced and the non-displaced workers are alike in all relevant pre-displacement 
characteristics then any difference in labour market outcome can be attributed to the job 
displacement.
8 There are several reasons why we believe that, in this application, matching is 
a most appropriate methodology. One obvious advantage is that, appropriately matched, it 
permits non-parametric estimation of the treatment effect. Moreover, matching addresses 
directly problems of common support and distributional issues. Finally, and probably of most 
importance, we argue that the major drawback of matching, i.e. that it cannot address 
unobserved selection, is practically negligible in this application. This is due to the nature of 
the event (plant closure) and the large number of relevent pre-displacement variables. 
 
 
4.1 The method of propensity score matching
9 
 
Let 
1 Y  and 
0 Y  denote the potential outcome of displacement (D=1) and non-displacement 
(D=0), respectively. Then, for the displaced workers 
1 Y  is observed, and 
0 Y  is observed for 
the non-displaced workers. Under certain conditions it is possible to estimate the treatment 
effect, even if 
0 Y  is not observed for those experiencing displacement. The assumption 
underlying the identification of the treatment effect, on the treated, by matching is the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA). The CIA requires that, given the observed 
characteristics X, the non-treatment outcome 
0 Y
 is independent of treatment status (D), i.e. 
no variables other than X affect both the assignment to treatment D and the outcome 
0 Y .
10 
More formally  
 
(1)  X D Y ⊥
0 . 
 
To identify the mean average effect of treatment on the treated, the CIA as stated in (1) is 
unnecessarily strong. It is sufficient that  
 
(2)  [ ] [ ] [ ] X Y E X D Y E X D Y E
0 0 0 , 0 , 1 = = = = . 
                                                 
8 Here the treatment is displacement and the terms displaced and treated will be used interchangeable. 
9 This and the following section draw from Smith and Todd (2003), Lechner (2001), Heckman et al. 
(1996), and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
10 It is also assumed that P(D=1|X)<1, implying that a match can be found for each treated individual. 
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If this assumption is valid, the unobserved contrafactual outcome of the treated can be 
estimated from the observed outcome of the matched non-treated. 
 
When only a few relevant covariates exist, matching directly on these covariates is 
straightforward, but when the number increases (or are continuously distributed) it is 
extremely unlikely that matches will be found. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) shows that if a 
function b(X), is a balancing score, i.e.  
 
(3)  ), (X b D X ⊥  
 
and if the CIA is valid for X, then the CIA is also valid for b(X). Thus, matching on b(X) is 
equivalent to matching directly on X, with the advantage that the difficulties with matching on 
a large set of covariates is eliminated. Furthermore, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) shows that 
the propensity score is a balancing score. The propensity score,  
 
(4)  [] X D E X D X p = = ≡ ) 1 Pr( ) ( , 
 
is defined as the conditional probability of receiving treatment given pre-treatment 
characteristics. 
 
 
4.2 Matching estimators 
 
In the literature several different methods of matching on propensity scores have been 
proposed. In this paper we will apply a simple nearest-neighbour matching method (NNM). 
With NNM each displaced worker i is matched to a non-displaced worker j such that: 
 
(5) 
{} ) ( ) ( min ) ( ) (
0 X p X p X p X p k i D k j i − = −
= ∈
 
 
This estimator can be applied both with and without invoking a common support requirement. 
Formally, the common support requirement means here that all displaced workers i such that    
 
(6)   
{} {}
) ( max ) ( ) ( min ) (
0 0 X p X p X p X p k
D k
i k D k i
= ∈ = ∈ > ∨ <
 
are excluded. Imposing common support is inefficient but decreases bias, and also implies 
that what we really estimate is the treatment effect on the treated that falls within the common 
support. In all estimations in this paper the common support is required. This has only 
implications for one of our estimations, and then only 2 individuals are excluded. See 
Appendix H. Applying this estimator, the average effect of displacement on those displaced is 
 
(7) 
{} {} ∑ ∑
= ∈ = = ∈ =
− = ∆
1
0
0 1
1
1
1 1
D j
jt
D D i
it
D
D
t Y
N
Y
N
 
 
An alternative to this estimator, proposed in Heckman et al. (1996), when both pre and post-
displacement data is available (as it is in this study) is a difference-in-difference (DID) 
matching estimator.
11 This estimator compares the difference in pre and post displacement 
                                                 
11 This estimator differs somewhat from the one in Heckman et al. (1995) in that we condition on p(X) 
and not on X. 
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can then be estimated by 
 
(8)  ()
{} ( )
{} ∑ ∑
= ∈ = = ∈ =
− − − = ∆
1
0 0
0 1
0 1
1
,
1 1
D j
j jt
D D i
i it
D
DID
t Y Y
N
Y Y
N
τ τ τ , 
 
where t is a time period after the displacement and τ is a time period before the displacement. 
The advantage with the DID matching estimator is that the CIA as stated previously can be 
relaxed. The identifying assumption is instead 
 
(9)  () [ ] ( ) [ ] X p D Y Y E X p D Y Y E t t , 0 , 1
0 0 0 0 = − = = − τ τ . 
 
That the CIA is valid is sufficient, but not necessary for the validity of this assumption. Even 
though CIA may not hold we could still identify the effect by the DID estimator if the bias 
due to a violation of CIA is the same in both the pre displacement period τ and the post 
displacement period t. However, if we try to minimize bias due to the failure of CIA, then we 
should probably include lagged values of the outcome variable in the conditioning set of X. 
Since, (9) could be reformulated as 
 
(10)     () [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] () [ ] X p D Y E X p D Y E X p D Y E X p D Y E t t , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1
0 0 0 0 = − = = = − = τ τ  
 
The difference on the left-hand side must, by definition, be equal to zero if the matching 
process is perfect, implying that also the right-hand side is equal to zero. The right-hand side 
equal to zero is equivalent to the CIA, thus we do not gain anything using the DID matching 
estimator. However, we will use this estimator to correct for the impact of any small 
differences in lagged outcome values as one never will find fully perfect matches. 
 
In econometrics much attention has been placed on reducing the selection bias resulting from 
differences in unobservables, when estimating the treatment effect, but the bias due to 
comparisons of groups, which are non-comparable in observable characteristics has largely 
been ignored. Even in the absence of unobserved differences, and if using model-based 
methods adjusting for observable differences in characteristics, the estimated treatment effect 
may not be valid for any causal inference, due to a lack of overlap in the explanatory 
variables in the treatment and control groups and/or from differences in the distribution of the 
explanatory variables between treated and non-treated within the region of the common 
support. See Rubin (1997). Heckman et al. (1999) examines the same sources of bias and 
reports that differences in the support of p(X) and differences in the distributions of p(X), 
within the common support, between the treatment and non-treatment group, are both 
important sources of bias. One of their major recommendations is that non-experimental 
comparison groups should be designed so that they have the same set of X or p(X) values as 
the treatment group. 
 
 
4.3 The validity of the CIA 
 
Although propensity score matching may reduce two of three sources of bias, it is essential 
that we are able to convincingly argue that selection on unobservables is not an important 
issue in this application, i.e. that the CIA is valid. Here, CIA means that, experiencing 
displacement is not affected by any unobservable factors also affecting the post displacement 
labour market outcomes. We believe that the CIA is indeed very reasonable in this case. This 
is due to the nature of the event of plant closure, the very extensive set of available pre-
displacement characteristics and information on the closure process up to three years before 
closure.  
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The event of plant closure has been studied widely since it is believed that any selection 
problems are reduced or eliminated. The motivation is that there is no selection in separations, 
since all workers have to leave in case of a closure. We stress the same argument in this 
paper, but only to the extent that it will reduce potential selection problems. The probability 
of experiencing plant closure cannot be viewed as a random event (if it could there would, of 
course, be no need for any conditioning variables). The closing firms are not a random sample 
of all firms nor are the displaced workers a random sample of all workers. The question is 
then whether we are able to observe all characteristics, which are jointly correlated with the 
probability of displacement and the labour market outcomes.  
 
There are several reasons why we should believe that workers at closing establishments differ 
from workers in general. Closing establishments are in general small and new. See Harris and 
Hassaszadeh (2001), Dunne et al. (1989) and Anderson and Vejsiu (2001). This implies of 
course that the workers have less tenure and probably also that they are younger. The 
structural change driving the closure of establishments is also over-represented in certain 
sectors of the economy. These sectors may in turn have distinctive profiles as regards, for 
example, region, gender, age, and education level. Regional conditions such as local 
unemployment level and wage level may also have an impact on the survival probability of 
establishments (Andersson and Vejsiu, 2001). These differences will not be a problem here. 
As can be seen from Appendix D, we have information on conceivably all these factors, both 
the factors influencing the probability of a closure and the differences in individual 
characteristics that they will result in.  
 
A matter of greater concern would be if the displaced workers differed from the non-
displaced even after conditioning on the factors mentioned above.  The stock of employees at 
closure is determined by the probability of becoming and remaining employed at the 
establishment. Hiring occurs through matching in the labour market and according to Dunne 
(1989) and Winter-Ebmer (2001), there may be systematic matching between workers who 
have a low preference for job security or less risk-averse and establishments with low survival 
probability. These workers may have a low opportunity cost of displacement, due to, for 
example, a weaker attachment to the labour market or work in a sector with high turnover 
where not only job destruction but also job creation is high, for example, in the restaurant and 
construction sectors. If such matching occurs then we could conceivably have a problem. On 
the other hand, even if the preference for job security, for example, is not directly measurable, 
it is likely that any such difference will show up in the workers’ employment/ unemployment 
history.
12 Since our data contain information about the workers attachment to the labour 
market up to four years prior to the displacement this may not be as severe as first stated. 
 
However, it is perhaps more obvious to search for unobserved selection in separations. While 
the employee is, of course, free to quit there are some restrictions on the employer right to 
dismiss particular individuals.
13 We see a potential selection problem to be if some of the 
workforce leaves the establishment before the closing year due to prior knowledge of an 
impending closure. One could speculate that those that remain until the bitter end may either 
be those who had poorer outside options or showed less initiative in pursuing outside options 
during the closure period compared to those who left earlier. This may be a problem as, 
particularly the initiative factor, may be difficult to quantify and control for. These factors 
will definitely be related to the post-displacement labour market outcome. Thus, our ability to 
                                                 
12 It is also possible that a indication of lower risk-averseness may show up in medical or sickness 
history.    
13 Swedish employment protection legislation stipulates that lays-offs for economic reasons are to 
proceed in accordance with seniority. However, the employer can unilaterally decide if the 
establishment is to close. 
  9also identify those who were displaced earlier in the closing process and pre-emptive quits, is 
important.
14  
 
 
4.4 Choice of matching variables 
 
The propensity scores are not known, but have to be estimated, which can be done with some 
standard probability model. The statistical literature does not give clear guidance on which 
variables to include in the estimation of the propensity scores.  However, the balancing score 
property and the CIA imply, that it is sufficient to only include covariates that are jointly 
correlated with the selection into treatment and the outcome, i.e. displacement and labour 
market status. This means that consistent modelling of the selection process by including 
covariates, which only determine the selection process, is not necessary. In fact, some authors 
claim that it could be dangerous to include instruments, since this could exacerbate the 
problem of common support. See Coniffe et al. (2000), Smith and Todd (2000), Augurzky 
(2001) and Lechner (2001). When it comes to the choice of which interactions and higher-
orders terms to include, this is determined solely by the need to achieve balance in propensity 
scores and covariate distributions. See Dehejia and Wahba (1998) and Coniffe et al, (2000). 
In the following we will outline the variables included in the estimations, as well as a brief 
motivation. 
  
Basic socio-demographic variables – The included socio-demographic variables are age, sex, 
marital status, number of children, and immigrant status. 
 
Labour market status – Pre displacement labour market status should be correlated with post 
displacement labour market status. As discussed in Section 4.3, it may also approximate 
worker’ preferences for job security, which could be correlated with probability of being 
employed at a closing establishment, if there is a matching of less stable workers to 
establishments with a higher exit rate, as suggested in Winter-Ebmer (2001). Therefore, we 
include an indicator of unemployment and employment. The degree of employment and 
unemployment is represented by the income from employment and unemployment, 
respectively. Finally, we include a limited measure of tenure, only indicating whether the 
worker has been employed at the same establishment in both November 1985 and November 
1986. 
 
Socio-economic variables – Apart from the variables presented above, we also distinguish 
between six education levels. We include three dummies indicating that the worker has 
taxable wealth, owns a house, and has received social assistance (the extent of social 
assistance is measured by a continuous variable similar to the ones measuring the degree of 
employment/unemployment). House ownership could indicate a preference for stability, 
which we argued in the previous section might be correlated with the likelihood to be 
employed at a more stable establishment, i.e. one that has a lower exit probability. House 
owners may also be more reluctant to move, which could have implications for  labour market 
outcome. Similar reasoning could motivate the inclusion of wealth. It could also be that 
workers’ taxable wealth is an accumulation of a steady stream of previous high income. A 
high income may be interpreted as high labour market quality, which will be reflected in a 
favourable labour market situation even in the future.  
 
Health variables – There is no doubt that there is a correlation between ill-health and 
unemployment. Most studies on this matter have, though, tried to establish a causal impact of 
unemployment on ill-health. See Jin (1995) for an overview of this literature. In this literature 
it is well recognized that there is a reverse mechanism, i.e. persons with ill-health are more 
                                                 
14 It should be noticed, though, that we only include workers who separated in the same year as the 
closure or within the year prior to the closure. 
  10prone to both become unemployed and remain unemployed. It is more doubtful whether there 
is a correlation between displacement due to a plant closure and pre-displacement health. 
Possibly, pre-displacement health could pick up differences in risk-averseness or productivity, 
which may be correlated with the probability of being employed at a closing establishment 
(see the discussion in Section 4.3). From the National Social Insurance Board’s register we 
know the length of hospital stays, as well as the number of sickness insurance days and the 
incidence of disability pension.  
 
Sector variables – The structural change driving the closure of establishments is over-
represented in certain sectors of the economy and the business cycle varies between sectors. 
Thus, the employment prospects will also differ between sectors. We use a rather detailed 
classification of the economic sectors, according to ISIC, containing 35 sector dummies. 
 
Establishment variables – From the Swedish Business Register we extract some information 
at the establishment level. We include measures of establishment size, the share of Swedish 
citizens, females and low and highly educated workers. As was discussed in Section 4.3, 
establishment size is a strong predictor of a closure. The other measures could be seen as 
measures of the human capital structure of the establishment. See Andersson and Vejsiu 
(2001).  
 
Regional variables – The municipalities have been grouped into nine classifications by the 
Swedish Association of Local Authorities. These are not based on the geographical locations, 
but on the population density in the municipally, nearness to big cities and on some 
dominating industry activities. We also include the local unemployment and employment rate 
as well as the local wage level. The local conditions may have an impact on the 
establishments’ exit probability as well as on future labour market outcomes. The channel by 
which these local measures may impact on the exit probabilities is, for example, through 
wage pressure (the worker’s outside option value increases with higher local wage levels and 
employment rates and lower unemployment rates). 
 
 
4.5 Who are the displaced workers? 
 
The descriptive statistics are presented in table 2. As was discussed in the previous section the 
displaced and non-displaced workers differ significantly. The largest differences are not 
found in individual characteristics, but in establishment characteristics. The displaced workers 
are employed in much smaller establishment. The average establishment size for the displaced 
workers is 55 employees. The corresponding figure for the non-displaced is 700. Moreover, 
the displaced workers are employed at establishments with a higher fraction of immigrants 
and low educated workers. Not surprisingly the displaced workers are overrepresented in the 
private sector, but there are differences in industrial sectors as well. In accordance with the 
stylized facts of displaced workers, we also find that more displaced workers have only short 
tenure and are less educated. The shorter tenure is also reflected in pre-displacement labour 
market status. The displaced workers have significantly longer periods of unemployment and 
consequently a lower degree of employment. Concerning socio-demographics and pre-
displacement health status the differences are less prominent, with one exception, the 
displaced workers are to a much lesser extent married. It is also notable that we do not find 
any large regional differences. 
 
 
4.6 Estimation of the propensity scores and the matching quality 
 
The probability of displacement due to establishment closure is the dependent variable in the 
estimation of the propensity scores. As independent variables we include all the variables 
described in Section 4.4, as well as various interactions and higher orders, if necessary, to 
  11balance the covariates.
15 Thereafter, each unit in the study group is matched to the closest unit 
within the control group, with respect to the logit of the propensity score, i.e. the log-odds 
ratio.
16 We match on the logit of the propensity score instead of directly on the propensity 
score because our sample is choice-based. With a choice-based sample the propensity score 
cannot be consistently estimated without re-weighting the sample. However, if one does not 
re-weight a choice-based sample, matching can still be performed but on the odds ratio or the 
log odds ratio. See Smith and Todd (2003).  
 
The balancing criteria applied here is that there is no significant difference, at the 5 percent 
level, in covariate means between the displaced and non-displaced workers. Focusing on the 
covariate means or the standardized difference in means is in line with several other 
applications of propensity score matching. See, for example Smith and Todd (2000), Sianesi 
(2002), Vuri (2002) and Larsson (2003). A stronger criterion would have been preferable, 
such as balance also in second and higher moments. Although, in theory with exact matches 
and with infinite samples the covariate distributions should be balanced, in practise this has 
been difficult to obtain. Despite a large reservoir of controls and numerous attempts with 
different specifications of the logit model, we have not been able to obtain balance in higher 
moments for all the covariates. On the other hand, most included variables are dummies, and 
for those obviously a first moment test is sufficient.  
 
To further assess the covariate balance gained by the matching, we calculate the standardized 
differences of the means both for the unmatched and matched samples.
17 As can be seen from 
Table 7, the matching has considerably improved the covariate balance. In the unmatched 
samples the absolute standardized difference is, in the extreme cases more than 1,000 percent, 
which should be compared to 7 percent in the matched samples. In all samples the average 
absolute standardized difference has been reduced from around 24 percent to 2.5 percent. 
 
 
5 The effect of displacement in 1987 on subsequent labour market status. 
 
5.1 Measures of labour market status 
 
We examine the labour market status of both the displaced and matched non-displaced 
workers in terms of employment, unemployment and being out of the labour force. 
Employment is measured by paid employment on average at least one hour per week in 
November. We have two measures of unemployment. For the entire period data is available 
on the incidence of unemployment benefit payments from the income registers.
18 This is from 
the same source as in the employment data mentioned above. From 1992 onwards we also 
have data from the National Labour Market Board (NLMB-data) which provides us with the 
number of days of registered (full-time) unemployment per person and year. The measure of 
                                                 
15 We estimate the propensity scores separately, for three age categories, The logit estimates are 
presented in Table 4. The estimated coefficients are not directly comparable, since the included higher 
orders and interactions, differ between the three specifications and are not presented in the table. 
16 The matching procedure is performed in Stata. The program used is a modification of psmatch.ado. 
See Sianesi ( 2001b). 
17 The standardized difference in means is calculated as  ( ) ( ) 2
2
0
2
1 0 1 = = = = + − = D D D D s s x x d . 
18 We have reason to believe that payment of unemployment benefit covers a very large proportion of 
unemployment as defined by the labour force survey (ILO definition). Roughly 70 percent of the ILO 
defined unemployed in Sweden received benefit in the early 1990s. This is a high figure even in a 
European perspective. See Standing (2000). Moreover, a large proportion of those not receiving benefit 
are those without an employment record. Both the displaced and the matched control group were 
employed in 1986. Note also that this data includes benefit payments for part-time unemployment. 
  12being out of the labour force is defined as zero annual income from employment and 
unemployment.  
 
 
5.2 Differences in labour market status 
 
We examine the labour market outcome following displacement for our chosen population i.e. 
those between the age of 20 and 50 in 1986. The average effect of displacement in 1987 on 
those displaced is measured by equation (7), i.e. we only refer to the difference-in-difference 
estimates, although the simple difference estimates can be found in the Appendix D.6. These 
treatment effects will be referred to as  “gaps” henceforth.  
 
Employment – Looking first at the degree of employment (paid employment in November) for 
the 20 to 50 year-olds in Figure 2, we observe an initial decline to just less than 0.08 in the 
same year as displacement which signifies that the employment rate was 8 percentage points 
lower for the displaced-1987 group. See also Table 11. We then observe a clear tendency to a 
narrowing of the gap with the matched control group, so that by November 1989 the 
difference in employment rates is 2.2 percent. However, in 1990 with the advent of the severe 
recession, we observe a distinct widening of the gap. The gap is at its widest in 1992. By the 
end of the period, in 1999, we still observe a significantly lower employment rate among the 
displaced workers amounting to 3.8 percentage units.  
 
Turning now to the employment results for the three age groups (see Figure 3 and Tables 8-
10) we observe the largest initial drop in employment for the 41 to 50 year olds, relative to the 
matched control group. However, all three age groups recover up to roughly a two-percentage 
point difference by 1989 (1990 for the oldest group). Indeed, we observe an almost total 
narrowing of the gap for the youngest group. The recession of the early 1990s hits the 
youngest two age groups first, between 89 and 90, with a larger initial loss for the 20 to 30 
year-olds. When, one year later, the gap widens also for the 41 to 50 year-olds, it widens 
appreciably. The post 1991 development is more diverse. The gap starts to narrow for the 
young groups as early as 1992, the middle group in 1993 and the oldest group in 1994. A new 
peak in the figure occurs in 1996 for the young, 1994 for the middle and 1995 for the oldest 
group. The widening of the gap again in the mid-1990s, most clearly observed for the 31 to 40 
year-olds coincides, roughly with the dip in aggregate employment between 1995 and 1997. 
See Figure 1. From 1997 onwards, as aggregate employment increases, the employment gap 
narrows for the two oldest age groups, while the gap remains the same for the 20 to 30 year 
olds.  
 
Unemployment – Figure 2 shows the gap in the incidence of unemployment (some 
unemployment benefit payment during the year), for all between the ages of 20 and 50 year. 
See also Table 15. It reveals more or less the mirror image of the employment graph. The 
immediate effect of the job loss led to just over 11 percentage point higher gap of the 
incidence of unemployment some time during 1987 for the displaced workers.
19 The gap 
declined up to 1989, remained quite steady between 1989 and 1991 and increased 
monotonically up to 1995 and then monotonically declined to the end of the period. 
Compared with employment, the echo in the troubled early 1990s is not so loud at the 
beginning but increases all the way up to 1995. After 1995 the echo subsides down to a gap of 
just over 1 percentage point. Figure 4 presents this data broken down into the three age 
groups. They show an initial widening of the gap and subsequent convergence up to 1989 for 
                                                 
19 This difference during the displacement year might be considered as rather low an in Table 15 we see 
that only 25 percent of the displaced workers experience any unemployment during the displacement 
year. Remembering the good Swedish labour market situation it is not an exceptionally low figure in a 
European perspective. Similar figures (around 30 percent) for joblessness have been observed in 
several European countries, although the incidence rate is much higher in the US, see Kuhn (2002).  
  13the youngest group, 1990 for the middle one and 1991 for the oldest, apart from a blip in 
1990. These local minimum points were lowest for the youngest group, followed by the oldest 
and then the middle group.  
 
For the period, from 1992 onwards we also use the NLMB-data to estimate the effect not only 
on incidence of unemployment, but also on the number of days unemployed. See Figures 6 
and 7. As the data measures different units it is not possible to link the two series.
20 The 
NLMB-data tells us that, in 1992, the young (20 to 30) displaced workers were, on average, 
unemployed for 3½ more days than the matched non-displaced. The corresponding difference 
for the middle age group was 18 days and 12 days for the oldest. By the end of the period, the 
unemployment gap for both the oldest and youngest groups was 4 days and was not 
statistically significant. The older group fell down to this level from, at the most, 15 days in 
1994. Over the period 1992 to 1999, the youngest group exhibited no clear downward trend. 
A much higher initial (18 days) and final gap (12 days) was observed for the 31 to 40 year 
olds and for the entire period the gaps were statistically significant.  
 
We wish to examine whether the difference in average days of unemployment is due to longer 
(or more frequent) spells of unemployment or if it is only attributed to the greater number of 
unemployed persons among the displaced workers, as we could see in Figure 2. It is not 
possible to decompose the average gap, as defined previously, on days in unemployment into 
these two components. It is, however, possible to do so if we redefine as a relative effect, i.e.  
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Defining the effect as an ratio instead of a difference, implies that the effect can be 
decomposed as, 
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where U is the number of unemployed days. The first term on the right hand side is the 
relative effect on unemployment days (given that they were unemployed), and second one is 
the relative effect on incidence of unemployment. The decomposition of the relative treatment 
effect is presented in Table 24, and we can interpret from this table that most of difference in 
average unemployment between the displaced and matched non-displaced can be attributed to 
a higher probability of being unemployed during a year among the displaced workers rather 
than longer (or more frequent) unemployment spells for those actually unemployed.  
 
Out of the labour force – When turning to our measure of being out of the labour force, the 
figures clearly differ, from what we previous have seen for employment and unemployment, 
as we do not observe any business cycle effect. The state of being out of the labour force 
increases over the period, both for the displaced and non-displaced workers. See Table 19. 
There is no large immediate gap, see Figure 5, but a small one that increases up to 1990-92 
and no tendency to an eradication of the gap towards the end of the period. Instead, what we 
see is a convergence during the recession, and then during the second half of the 1990’s a 
return to the levels in 1990-92, which now seems to become permanent. These differences are 
significant and correspond to, on average, around 2 percentage points. In particular, we 
observe an appreciable gap for the oldest age group, which increases up to the end of the 1990 
and shows no sign of diminishing at the end of the observation period. 
 
                                                 
20 However, we can observe that there is some compatibility in the two series in terms of the ranking of 
the three age groups. In both series, the widest gap can be found for the 31 to 40 year olds, followed by 
the 40 to 50 year olds and with the youngest group exhibiting a very small gap. 
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between the displaced and non-displaced in the same year as the displacement. During the 
first years after displacement the gap with the matched control group narrowed appreciably 
and by 1989 there were only small differences in both employment and unemployment rates. 
It is equally clear that the convergence was arrested upon the advent of the recession at the 
beginning of the 1990s and then reversed. Thus there is clear evidence of an echo. One can 
even see tendency of another smaller echo when the minor recovery up to 1995 petered out. 
Thus, bad times hit the displaced group harder than the non-displaced. It would appear 
difficult to interpret this, in particular the pre-1993 experiences, in any way other than that 
they first found new jobs and subsequently lost them to a greater extent than the control group 
in the recession. Even the post-1992 break-down of the unemployment data from the NLMB 
suggest a more frequent incidence of unemployment as opposed to longer periods, suggesting 
recurrent displacement. Being out of the labour force does not exhibit the same business cycle 
pattern as the other two states. 
 
Over the entire period the greatest negative employment effects are found for the oldest group 
and smallest negative effects for the youngest group. The youngest group also experiences 
appreciably lower unemployment over the period with the 31 to 40 year olds exhibiting 
slightly higher levels than the older group. Being out of the labour force is appreciably higher 
for the oldest displaced group but with very small displacement effects for the 31 to 40 year 
olds. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
We have studied the long-term effect of displacements in 1987, due to establishment closures, 
on labour market outcomes and have found significant long-term effects compared to the 
matched control group. Not surprisingly, the largest gap between the displaced and non-
displaced group is found in the year of displacement, i.e. in 1987, even if the gap could be 
viewed as relatively small. Moreover, this relatively small initial narrow gap is almost totally 
closed within three years. Both the low initial gap and the rapid and almost total catch-up are, 
presumably due to the very good labour market up to 1990. Regardless of the reason, one 
important point here is that we cannot expect that the experience of these first three years 
would have been “scarring” in terms of discouragement, stigmatisation and other factors often 
cited in the unemployment persistence literature. 
 
However, very early in the severe recession of the early 1990s the picture changes 
dramatically. This is initially most obvious in the employment gap and somewhat later on in 
the unemployment gap. The stark contrasting states of the labour market, before and during 
the recession, and the divergent experiences of the displaced group relative to other similar 
but non-displaced workers, provides us with our first conclusion, namely that post-
displacement labour market status is extremely sensitive to the general state of the labour 
market. This result appears well established particularly as we have argued quite strongly that 
we do not expect any selection on unobservables to be much of a problem in this application. 
This business cycle sensitivity feature should be borne in mind when evaluating policy 
measures directed to displaced workers. 
 
The question thus arises why the displaced group experienced lower employment rates during 
the recession? While we cannot explicitly identify displacement after the initial displacement 
in 1987, it would appear somewhat far-fetched to propose any process other than involuntary 
job loss. As we observe a good labour market development for these individuals for the first 
three years prior to the recession, without the potentially scarring effects mentioned above 
and similar employment rates before the recession, there would appear to be only one possible 
explanation for a higher subsequent displacement probability. These jobs were lost because 
  15they were, compared to the matched control group, new jobs. “New jobs end early” is one of 
the stylised facts of the job mobility literature. While in the Swedish institutional context one 
could attribute this as simply a strict application of last-in first-out clause in statutory labour 
law, it may also be related to higher separation probabilities for those with low levels of 
specific capital, under the reasonable assumption that specific capital varies inversely with 
tenure. Specific capital is comprised of two elements. Firm specific human capital in the usual 
meaning of the term, i.e. that accumulated by training and experience. But it is also something 
acquired in a matching process that continues even after hiring.  
 
The lowest negative employment effects were largest for the older two age groups. 
Presumably the younger displaced group did not have appreciably shorter jobs than the 
equally young control group. Also somewhat in line with our interpretation of the persistence 
story is that the greater average number of unemployment days in the displaced group appears 
to be more related to more displaced workers being unemployed rather than longer duration 
of unemployment or more frequent unemployment spells within a given year.  
 
We were also able to find some long-term effects lasting for the entire observation period of 
13 for years. Such effects were found for the employment gap for both the 20 to 30 and 41 to 
50 year olds. A very significant long run effect was that the high out of the labour force gap 
for the oldest age group that exhibited no sign of subsiding by 1999. Rather smaller very long 
run effects were found for unemployment. Interestingly, unemployment has been the main 
labour market status studied in the scarring literature. The very long run effects found here do 
not appear to be found in most other studies. See, for example Fallick (1996) review of the 
literature, which shows that the effects fade away after roughly four years. 
 
If our explanation is correct this has implications for the unemployment persistence literature 
which has predominately been on why workers who lose their jobs may not secure new ones. 
This has been viewed as being due to long-term scarring effect of the loss of human capital, 
stigmatisation, welfare incentives etc. We interpret the long run effects as being that displaced 
workers are more likely to experience new job loss and possibly new spells of unemployment. 
Thus as the use of the word echo in the title indicates, the sound of the initial job loss echoes 
as time passes, albeit diminishing in volume, but lasting for a long time. 
 
Perhaps the most obvious policy implications following from the specific capital explanation 
story is that it is not only important that displaced workers find a match but that they find a 
good  match. However, it is far from clear how active labour market policy, at least in 
Sweden, can do more than currently is the case.  
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  18A Data sources 
 
To create this data set we have used several different registers and databases. To identify the 
study- and control groups the Register based Labour Market Statistics (RAMS), have been 
utilized. From this register, we have also collected a set of variables for the period 1985-99. 
During the period 1990-99, the Longitudinal database of Education, Income and Employment 
(LOUISE) is the main source. This database do not cover, though, the year prior to 1990, 
therefore we have tried to collect the corresponding information for 1983-89 from the Income 
and Wealth registers (IoF), which is a set of registers, to create longitudinal data for the whole 
period 1983-99. All these sources will be briefly described below. 
 
The Register based Labour Market Statistics (RAMS) – This annual data is based on several 
registers, including all individuals, firms and establishments in Sweden, and cover the period 
1985-99. The main source is the employers’ payroll reports to the tax authorities. By law, all 
employers are annually obliged to file an income statement for each payee to the Swedish 
national tax board. This makes it possible to link employees to establishment and firms. This 
feature is most important for the underlying study since it enables us to identify individuals on 
closing establishments. In addition to establishment information linked to the individual, a lot 
of socio-demographic information as well as income information are collected from this 
register.   
 
The Income and Wealth registers (IoF) – The income and wealth registers contain the whole 
Swedish population and provides detailed annual income information. The statistics are 
mainly based on administrative records from the Swedish National Tax Board, and the 
variables, relevant for this study, in particular from the tax forms and the employers’ payroll 
reports.   
 
The Longitudinal database of Education, Income and Employment (LOUISE) – LOUISE is an 
individual based longitudinal database containing all individuals in Sweden aged 16 and 
above. It is an integration of a large number of register and its variables cover several 
different areas, such as demographics, education, employment/unemployment, income, and 
establishments, for the period 1990-99. 
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When no survey is addressed to the firm, Statistics Sweden performs a different control of the 
closing establishments. By a demographic method they check whether the establishment have 
disappeared due to mergers or dispersals. We apply the same method, constituted by the 
following two conditions. 
 
Condition 1    5 . 0 / ≤ j ij N N
Condition 2    5 . 0 / ≤ i ij N N
 
Where   is the number of individuals employed at the closing establishment i in year t-1 
and at establishment j in year t.   is the total number of individuals employed at the closing 
establishment  i in year t-1 and   is the total number of individuals employed at 
establishment j in year t. 
ij N
i N
j N
 
If not both conditions are fulfilled, this indicates that the establishment has been wrongly 
classified as a closure. In case that condition 1 is not satisfied the establishment is likely to 
have ceased to exist due to dispersal. On the other hand, if condition 2 is not satisfied this 
indicates that the establishment has been merged into a larger unit. In our sample, all 
establishments satisfy both these conditions.  
 
 
C Definitions of length (time-window) of closing process  
 
Definition 1 For an establishment closed in year t the closing process 3 years if  
a) the number of employees in t-3 was 50 or more, 
b) there was a reduction of the workforce, between both t-3 and t-2, and between t-2 and t-1, 
by at least 20 percent. 
 
Definition 2 For an establishment closed in year t the closing process is 2 years if 
a) the closing process is not 3 years according to definition 1, 
b) the number of employees in t-2 was 25 or more, 
c) there was a reduction of the workforce, between t-2 and t-1, by at least 10 employees, and 
d) the reduction in the number of employees corresponded to at least a 20 percent reduction of 
the workforce. 
 
Definition 3 For an establishment closed in year t the closing process is 1 year if the closing 
process is not 2 or 3 years according to definition 1 and 2. 
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D.1 Variable definitions 
 
Table 1 Variable definitions and descriptions. 
Variable Definition/Description 
Socio-demographic variables   
AGE_86  Age in 1986 
D_FEMALE Women 
D_CHILD06_86  Has child/-ren aged 0-6 year. 
D_CHILD717_86  Has child/-ren aged 7-17 year. 
D_MARRIED_86  Was married in 1986. 
D_IMMIGRANT_N  Born in other Nordic country. 
D_IMMIGRANT_O  Born in non-Nordic country. 
Labour market status   
D_EMPL_yy  Had non-zero earnings in 19yy. 
D_UNEMPL_yy  Incidence of insured unemployment in 19yy. 
D_LMP_yy  Participation in labour market program.  
EMPL_yy  Annual earnings in 19yy. 
UNEMPL_yy  Amount of unemployment insurance in 19yy. 
LMP_yy  Income from labour market program. 
D_TENURE  Was employed at the same establishment in both 1985 and 1986 
Socio-economic variables   
D_EDUC1_86  Compulsory school, less than 9 years. 
D_EDUC2_86  Compulsory school, 9 years. 
D_EDUC3_86  Upper secondary school, shorter than 3 years. 
D_EDUC4_86  Upper secondary school, equal to or longer than 3 years. 
D_EDUC5_86  Tertiary education, shorter than 3 years. 
D_EDUC6_86  Tertiary education, equal to or longer than 3 years. 
D_EDUC7_86 Graduate  studies. 
D_EDUC0_86 Unknown  education. 
D_HOUSE_86  Owned a house in 1986. 
D_WEALTH_86  Had taxable wealth in 1986. 
D_SA_yy Social  assistant receiver in 19yy. 
SA_yy  Amount of social assistance in 19yy. 
Health variables   
D_HOSPITAL_yy  Spend at least on night in hospital in 19yy. 
D_SICK_yy  Incidence of insured sickness in 19yy. 
D_DISABILITY_86 Received  disability pension in 1986. 
HOSPITAL_yy  Number of days spent in hospital in 19yy. 
SICK_yy  Number of insured sickness days. 
Sector variables   
D_PUBLIC_86  Employed in public sector in 1986. 
D_SNI0_86 Activities  not  adequately defined 
D_SNI1_86  Agriculture and hunting 
D_SNI2_86 Forestry 
D_SNI3_86 Fishing 
D_SNI4_86 Coal  mining 
D_SNI5_86  Metal ore mining 
D_SNI6_86 Other  mining 
D_SNI7_86  Manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco 
D_SNI8_86  Textile, wearing apparel and leather industries 
D_SNI9_86  Manufacture of wood and wood products 
D_SNI10_86  Manufacture of paper and paper products 
D_SNI11_86  Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
D_SNI12_86  Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 
D_SNI13_86  Basic metal industries 
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Variable  Definition/Description 
Sector variables  
D_SNI14_86  Manufacture of fabricated metal products 
D_SNI15_86  Other manufacturing industries 
D_SNI16_86  Electricity, gas and heating 
D_SNI17_86 Water  supply 
D_SNI18_86 Construction 
D_SNI19_86 Wholesale  trade 
D_SNI20_86 Retail  trade 
D_SNI21_86  Restaurants and hotels 
D_SNI22_86  Transport and storage 
D_SNI23_86  Post and telecommunication 
D_SNI24_86 Financial  institutions 
D_SNI25_86 Insurance 
D_SNI26_86  Real estate and business services 
D_SNI27_86  Public administration and defence 
D_SNI28_86  Sewage and refuse disposal, and sanitation 
D_SNI29_86 Education,  research and scientific institutes 
D_SNI30_86  Medical, dental, other health and veterinary services, and welfare 
institutions 
D_SNI31_86  Business, professional and labour associations 
D_SNI32_86  Other social and related community services 
D_SNI33_86  Recreational and cultural services 
D_SNI34_86  Personal and household services 
D_SNI35_86  International and other extra-territorial bodies 
Regional variables  
D_KKSS_86  Resident in larger city in 1986. 
D_KKF_86  Resident in a suburban municipality in 1986. 
D_KKG_86  Resident in a sparsely populated municipality. 
D_KKL_86  Resident in a countryside municipality in 1986. 
D_KKMK_86  Resident in other small municipality in 1986. 
D_KKMS_86  Resident in medium-sized city in 1986. 
D_KKN_86  Resident in industrial municipality.  
D_KKS_86  Resident in big city in 1986. 
LOC_WAGE_86  Local average annual income level.  
LOC_EMPL_86  Local employment rate. 
LOC_UNEMPL_86  Local unemployment rate. 
Establishment variables   
EST_NONNORDIC  Share of non-Nordic employees. 
EST_FEMALES  Share of female employees. 
EST_EDUC120  Share of employees with short education. 
EST_EDUC34  Share of employees with medium long education. 
EST_EDUC567  Share of employees with long education. 
EST_SIZE  Number of employees. 
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The descriptive statistics are only given for the full sample retained for the analysis. 
All dummy variables have the prefix D_. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics. 
               Displaced              Non-displaced     
Variable Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev.  t   
Socio-demographic variables 
AGE_86 33.508  8.951  34.895  8.607  -10.35   
D_FEMALE 0.508    0.529    -2.74   
D_CHILD06_86 0.214    0.247    -5.33   
D_CHILD717_86 0.306   0.358   -7.61   
D_MARRIED_86 0.382   0.478   -13.20   
D_IMMIGRANT_N 0.064    0.049    4.17   
D_IMMIGRANT_O 0.055    0.038    5.11   
Labour market status 
D_EMPL_83 0.946    0.966    -6.03   
D_EMPL_84 0.963    0.980    -6.07   
D_EMPL_85 0.980    0.990    -4.85   
D_UNEMPL_83 0.154    0.094    11.09   
D_UNEMPL_84 0.137    0.083    10.46   
D_UNEMPL_85 0.130    0.071    11.74   
D_LMP_83 0.048    0.027    6.54   
D_LMP_84 0.044    0.026    5.94   
D_LMP_85 0.050    0.023    8.25   
EMPL_83 59,218.520  44,566.270  68,347.510  42,348.440  -13.67   
EMPL_84 68,310.650  46,843.880  78,268.920  44,962.380  -14.19   
EMPL_85 76,803.560  48,700.560  87,631.690  47,408.280  -14.83   
UNEMPL_83 1,690.026  6,089.270  966.274  4,416.114  7.99   
UNEMPL_84 1,644.644  6,064.135  914.201  4,507.268  8.09   
UNEMPL_85 1,828.578  6,932.950  908.334  4,636.034  8.94   
LMP_83 675.417  4,066.848  437.609  3,547.503  3.91   
LMP_84 702.329  4,500.820  433.305  3,600.228  4.01   
LMP_85 980.715  5,916.146  416.493  3,691.804  6.43   
D_TENURE 0.522    0.737    -28.77   
Socio-economic variables 
D_EDUC1_86 0.149    0.119    5.55   
D_EDUC2_86 0.181    0.140    7.15   
D_EDUC3_86 0.359    0.351    1.17   
D_EDUC4_86 0.111    0.119    -1.74   
D_EDUC5_86 0.078    0.118    -9.87   
D_EDUC6_86 0.060    0.108    -13.47   
D_EDUC7_86 0.002    0.006    -5.80   
D_EDUC0_86 0.060    0.039    6.01   
D_HOUSE_86 0.322    0.415    -13.23   
D_WEALTH_86 0.438    0.507    -9.30   
D_SA_83 0.082    0.037    11.09   
D_SA_84 0.093    0.041    11.96   
D_SA_85 0.092    0.041    11.70   
SA_83 857.567  4,771.011  282.542  2,415.147  8.14   
SA_84 889.094  4,407.111  321.688  2,548.687  8.69   
SA_85 968.907  4,860.831  344.700  2,733.966  8.67   
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              Displaced              Non-displaced     
Variable Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev.  t   
Health  variables          
D_HOSPITAL_83 0.052   0.056   -1.42   
D_HOSPITAL_84 0.063   0.061   0.59   
D_HOSPITAL_85 0.066   0.058   2.11   
D_SICK_83  0.610   0.640   -4.08   
D_SICK_84  0.645   0.658   -1.84   
D_SICK_85  0.685   0.708   -3.23   
D_DISABILITY_86  0.002   0.003   -1.43   
HOSPITAL_83 0.752  4.480  0.970  5.510  -3.22   
HOSPITAL_84 0.773  6.593  0.633  5.843  1.41   
HOSPITAL_85 0.790  6.538  0.593  5.776  2.02   
SICK_83  14.080 31.867  13.056 31.981  2.14   
SICK_84  16.427 37.719  14.457 35.317  3.49   
SICK_85  19.471 43.414  16.507 38.704  4.57   
Sector  variables          
D_PUBLIC_86  0.242   0.460   -33.78   
D_SNI0_86  0.000   0.000     
D_SNI1_86  0.002   0.004   -2.90   
D_SNI2_86  0.027   0.004   9.62   
D_SNI3_86  0.003   0.000   3.82   
D_SNI4_86  0.000   0.000   -1.42   
D_SNI5_86  0.000   0.003   -19.65   
D_SNI6_86  0.000   0.001   -9.65   
D_SNI7_86  0.007   0.022   -11.66   
D_SNI8_86  0.035   0.011   8.88   
D_SNI9_86  0.036   0.019   6.10   
D_SNI10_86  0.022   0.036   -6.35   
D_SNI11_86  0.028   0.025   1.32   
D_SNI12_86  0.005   0.007   -1.62   
D_SNI13_86  0.020   0.017   1.36   
D_SNI14_86  0.143   0.145   -0.30   
D_SNI15_86  0.000   0.002   -15.08   
D_SNI16_86  0.010   0.010   -0.47   
D_SNI17_86  0.000   0.000   -6.86   
D_SNI18_86  0.000   0.000     
D_SNI19_86  0.055   0.049   1.78   
D_SNI20_86  0.042   0.053   -3.51   
D_SNI21_86  0.115   0.017   20.78   
D_SNI22_86  0.061   0.045   4.46   
D_SNI23_86  0.018   0.033   -7.47   
D_SNI24_86  0.018   0.019   -0.57   
D_SNI25_86  0.008   0.014   -4.50   
D_SNI26_86  0.097   0.046   11.66   
D_SNI27_86  0.034   0.063   -10.37   
D_SNI28_86  0.035   0.007   10.50   
D_SNI29_86  0.022   0.078   -24.16   
D_SNI30_86  0.126   0.240   -22.58   
D_SNI31_86  0.007   0.004   2.33   
D_SNI32_86  0.000   0.006   -26.02   
D_SNI33_86  0.016   0.014   1.31   
D_SNI34_86  0.007   0.007   -0.28   
D_SNI35_86  0.000   0.000   -1.00   
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                Displaced              Non-displaced     
Variable Mean  Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev.  t   
Regional  variables          
D_KKSS_86  0.250   0.284   -5.11   
D_KKF_86  0.186   0.157   5.10   
D_KKG_86  0.019   0.018   0.47   
D_KKL_86  0.029   0.029   -0.07   
D_KKMK_86  0.064   0.060   0.89   
D_KKMS_86  0.130   0.154   -4.62   
D_KKN_86  0.049   0.069   -6.22   
D_KKS_86  0.204   0.161   7.11   
D_KKSK_86  0.069   0.068   0.08   
LOC_WAGE_86  932.954 89.806  926.276 86.156  4.96   
LOC_EMPL_86 0.834  0.034  0.835  0.030  -1.44   
LOC_UNEMPL_86 0.041  0.022  0.041  0.019  -0.22   
Establishment variables 
EST_NONNORDIC 0.063  0.089  0.043  0.061  15.14   
EST_FEMALES 0.478  0.288  0.510  0.301  -7.50   
EST_EDUC120 0.441  0.232  0.337  0.206  30.13   
EST_EDUC34 0.426  0.171  0.445  0.163  -7.64   
EST_EDUC567 0.133  0.183  0.218  0.219  -30.70   
EST_SIZE 55.352  53.204  726.664  1,507.724  -151.33   
 
 
D.3 The number of closing establishments and displaced workers 
 
Table 3 The number of closing establishments and displaced workers. 
Year of 
closure 
Year of 
separation  Age 20-30  Age 31-40  Age 41-50  Total   Establishments 
1988 1987  392  308  279  979  32 
1987 1987  1,560 1,073 1,000 3,633  339 
1987-1988 1987  1,952  1,381  1,279  4,612  371 
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Table 4 Logit estimates  
         Age 20-30          Age 31-40          Age 41-50 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
Socio-demographic variables 
AGE_86  -0.128 0.154 0.356 0.287 0.169 0.381 
D_FEMALE  0.190  0.065 -0.116  0.086 -0.069  0.087 
D_CHILD06_86  -0.099 0.079  -0.067 0.071 -0.033 0.125 
D_CHILD717_86  0.005 0.123  -0.003 0.069 0.070 0.068 
D_MARRIED_86 -0.110  0.084  -0.020  0.070 -0.324  0.070 
D_IMMIGRANT_N -0.144  0.145  0.236  0.113 0.196 0.115 
D_IMMIGRANT_O  -0.031 0.160 0.043 0.146 -0.110 0.145 
Labour market status 
D_EMPL_83  0.068 0.118  -0.115 0.167 -0.108 0.220 
D_EMPL_84  0.005 0.149 0.072 0.195 -0.091 0.260 
D_EMPL_85  0.193 0.184 0.083 0.232 0.080 0.321 
D_UNEMPL_83 0.042  0.089  0.570  0.165 0.645  0.165 
D_UNEMPL_84 0.178  0.093  -0.609  0.213 0.051 0.199 
D_UNEMPL_85 -0.091  0.098  0.821  0.179 0.093 0.197 
D_LMP_83  0.101 0.172  -0.115 0.278 0.070 0.285 
D_LMP_84  -0.083 0.180 0.177 0.293 -0.115 0.314 
D_LMP_85  0.003 0.160  -0.352 0.276 -0.089 0.299 
EMPL_83/1000 0.002  0.002  -0.003  0.003 0.005  0.002 
EMPL_84/1000  -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
EMPL_85/1000 0.000  0.001  -0.004  0.002 -0.003  0.001 
UNEMPL_83/1000  0.004 0.006  -0.031 0.020 -0.016 0.009 
UNEMPL_84/1000 -0.009 0.006 0.054  0.022 -0.011 0.010 
UNEMPL_85/1000 0.004  0.005  -0.049  0.019 0.014 0.008 
LMP_83/1000  -0.010 0.010 0.038 0.030 -0.006 0.013 
LMP_84/1000  -0.016 0.009  -0.031 0.027 0.019 0.013 
LMP_85/1000  0.016  0.006 0.003 0.022 0.000 0.014 
D_TENURE  -0.522  0.054  -0.658  0.063 -0.647  0.067 
Socio-economic variables 
D_EDUC2_86  0.119 0.373 0.045 0.108 -0.317  0.122 
D_EDUC3_86  -0.019 0.372 0.193 0.102 0.005 0.083 
D_EDUC4_86  -0.131 0.378 0.007 0.136 0.019 0.120 
D_EDUC5_86  -0.069 0.384 0.071 0.143 -0.044 0.140 
D_EDUC6_86  0.097 0.397 0.156 0.155 -0.072 0.157 
D_EDUC7_86     0.440 0.611 -0.409  0.512 
D_EDUC0_86  -0.054 0.378  -0.177 0.153 -0.042 0.171 
D_HOUSE_86  0.075 0.074  -0.045 0.068 -0.067 0.068 
D_WEALTH_86  -0.044 0.053  -0.120 0.063 -0.026 0.066 
D_SA_83  0.068 0.129  -0.047 0.174 -0.235 0.229 
D_SA_84  0.121 0.125  -0.039 0.175 0.306 0.224 
D_SA_85  0.058 0.118 0.223 0.164 -0.151 0.232 
SA_83/1000  0.008 0.010 0.012 0.018 0.036  0.011 
SA_84/1000  -0.012 0.011 0.017 0.016 -0.027 0.017 
SA_85/1000  0.010 0.008  -0.019 0.013 0.023 0.014 
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          Age 20-30          Age 31-40          Age 41-50 
 Coef.  Std.  Err. Coef.  Std.  Err. Coef.  Std.  Err. 
Health variables 
D_HOSPITAL_83  0.360  0.178 0.025 0.207 0.342 0.292 
D_HOSPITAL_84  0.134  0.121 -0.021  0.179 -0.241  0.155 
D_HOSPITAL_85  0.040 0.116 0.220 0.169 0.026 0.144 
D_SICK_83  -0.011  0.065 -0.082  0.076 -0.019  0.072 
D_SICK_84  -0.021 0.064 0.139 0.077  -0.090 0.072 
D_SICK_85  -0.072 0.063 0.031 0.077  -0.087 0.073 
D_DISABILITY_86 -0.689  1.030 -1.126  0.603 -0.571  0.402 
HOSPITAL_83  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 
HOSPITAL_84 -0.002  0.001  0.004  0.002 0.000 0.001 
HOSPITAL_85  0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002  -0.001 0.001 
SICK_83  -0.014 0.008 0.026 0.039  -0.027 0.025 
SICK_84  -0.006 0.007  -0.013 0.023 0.001 0.005 
SICK_85  0.003 0.004  -0.033 0.020 0.000 0.005 
Sector variables 
D_PUBLIC_86 0.020  0.113  -0.501  0.128  -0.419  0.133 
D_SNI1_86 -0.549  0.432  -0.834  0.610     
D_SNI2_86  1.871  0.227  2.413  0.226  2.414  0.233 
D_SNI3_86  3.426  0.561     3.033  1.251 
D_SNI7_86  -0.653  0.278  -1.145  0.364  -1.179  0.407 
D_SNI8_86  1.236  0.195 0.438 0.228 0.905  0.209 
D_SNI9_86  0.769  0.171  0.495  0.208  0.829  0.203 
D_SNI10_86  -0.213 0.239 0.045 0.231 0.654  0.198 
D_SNI11_86  0.952  0.184  0.800  0.203  0.501  0.229 
D_SNI12_86  0.693  0.297 0.004 0.413  -1.021 0.600 
D_SNI13_86  1.268  0.303  2.112  0.248  2.139  0.240 
D_SNI14_86  0.734  0.129  0.929  0.141  0.885  0.151 
D_SNI16_86  0.844  0.290  0.912  0.285 0.352 0.339 
D_SNI19_86           
D_SNI20_86  -0.408  0.149  -1.306  0.210  -1.095  0.213 
D_SNI21_86  1.325  0.132  0.730  0.175  0.682  0.191 
D_SNI22_86  0.412  0.145  0.337  0.167  0.481  0.179 
D_SNI23_86  0.693  0.213 -0.429  0.357 -0.154  0.343 
D_SNI24_86  0.577  0.206  -0.161 0.271 0.207 0.257 
D_SNI25_86  -0.563 0.406  -0.557 0.333 0.240 0.296 
D_SNI26_86  0.805  0.133  0.513  0.149  0.421  0.162 
D_SNI27_86  1.086  0.192 -0.280  0.255 -0.249  0.265 
D_SNI28_86  1.140  0.183  0.825  0.208  1.090  0.227 
D_SNI29_86  -0.510  0.255  -1.528  0.269  -1.181  0.260 
D_SNI30_86  -0.077  0.180 -0.374  0.202 -0.028  0.210 
D_SNI31_86  0.622 0.395 0.436 0.349 0.069 0.346 
D_SNI33_86  0.552  0.193 -0.266  0.277 -1.671  0.527 
D_SNI34_86  -0.504  0.317 -0.491  0.354 -0.376  0.394 
Regional variables 
D_KKSS_86  0.187 0.123 0.211 0.140 0.112 0.137 
D_KKF_86  0.608  0.151  0.435  0.182 0.135 0.184 
D_KKG_86 0.102  0.192  -0.465  0.259  -1.276  0.371 
D_KKL_86  -0.277 0.196 0.228 0.189 0.270 0.199 
D_KKMK_86  0.052 0.153 0.144 0.163 0.230 0.161 
D_KKMS_86  0.097 0.126  -0.006 0.143 0.003 0.142 
D_KKN_86  -0.405  0.155 -0.299  0.170 -0.041  0.161 
D_KKS_86  0.376  0.149  0.522  0.178 0.248 0.177 
LOC_WAGE_86  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
LOC_EMPL_86  -0.382 1.648  -3.623  34.513 0.731 1.910 
LOC_UNEMPL_86 3.025 4.797 0.684 6.244 5.445 3.024 
 
 
  27Table 4 continued. 
          Age 20-30            Age 31-40            Age 41-50 
  Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err Coef.  Std. Err 
Establishment variables 
EST_NONNORDIC 0.463 0.309 1.171  0.364 2.380  0.403 
EST_FEMALES -0.003  0.136 1.018  0.171 0.998  0.178 
EST_EDUC567  -1.327  0.212 -0.899  0.234 -0.856  0.246 
EST_EDUC34  -0.886  0.185 -1.720  0.235 -1.572  0.241 
EST_SIZE  -0.009  0.001 -0.004  0.001 -0.002 0.001 
        
Number of obs  42628  42349  37304   
Log L  -6232  -4689  -4384   
Pseudo R2  0.214  0.229  0.213   
 
 
D.5 Sample sizes and matching quality 
 
Table 5 Sample size before and after matching 
  Unmatched sample  Matched sample   
Age 20-30         
Displaced 1,952    1,952  (1,952)   
Non-displaced 41,144    1,952  (1,731)   
Age 31-40         
Displaced 1,381    1,379  (1,379)   
Non-displaced 41,457    1,379  (1,250)   
Age 41-50         
Displaced 1,279    1,279  (1,279)   
Non-displaced 36,640    1,279  (1,165)   
 
 
Table 6 Summary statistic of the propensity of becoming displaced (log-odds-ratio). 
                       Unmatched sample         Matched sample 
  Mean  Min  Max  Mean  Min  Max 
Age  20-30         
Displaced  -2.105  -5.227  1.102 -2.105 -5.227  1.102 
Non-displaced  -29.215 -611.449  1.213 -2.105 -5.227  1.107 
Age  31-40         
Displaced  -2.317  -5.385  1.083 -2.317 -5.385  1.083 
Non-displaced  -56.810  -1,667.430  1.665 -2.317 -5.385  1.052 
Age  41-50         
Displaced  -2.348  -4.999  0.954 -2.348 -4.999  0.954 
Non-displaced  -63.237  -2,365.273  1.024 -2.348 -4.999  1.003 
 
 
Table 7 Absolute standardized difference before and after matching. 
  Unmatched sample  Matched sample 
  Mean Min  Max Mean Min  Max 
Age 20-30  24.477  0.007  1525.507  2.001  0.000  5.696 
Age 31-40  24.739  0.442  1208.690  2.594  0.000  5.957 
Age 41-50  20.609  0.387  1038.979  2.521  0.000  7.560 
 
 
 
 
 
  28D.6 Results 
 
Table 8 Estimated average effect of displacement on the employment probability for workers aged 20-
30.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 1.000  1.000 0.000  . -0.015  -1.20 
1987 0.864  0.917 -0.053  -5.09  -0.068  -4.52 
1988 0.877  0.921 -0.044  -4.36  -0.059  -3.91 
1989 0.910  0.910 -0.001  -0.05  -0.015  -1.03 
1990 0.884  0.910 -0.027  -2.61  -0.042  -2.68 
1991 0.844  0.877 -0.033  -2.85  -0.048  -2.98 
1992 0.803  0.834 -0.031  -2.36  -0.046  -2.66 
1993 0.730  0.753 -0.023  -1.55  -0.038  -2.04 
1994 0.755  0.786 -0.031  -2.19  -0.046  -2.54 
1995 0.769  0.790 -0.022  -1.53  -0.036  -2.01 
1996 0.780  0.795 -0.015  -1.07  -0.030  -1.64 
1997 0.779  0.801 -0.023  -1.62  -0.037  -2.09 
1998 0.800  0.833 -0.034  -2.57  -0.049  -2.79 
1999 0.803  0.825 -0.022  -1.67  -0.037  -2.13 
 
 
Table 9 Estimated average effect of displacement on the employment probability for workers aged 31-
40.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 1.000  1.000 0.000  .  0.002  0.20 
1987 0.888  0.960 -0.073  -7.09  -0.070  -5.02 
1988 0.901  0.951 -0.049  -4.81  -0.047  -3.34 
1989 0.913  0.937 -0.024  -2.31 -0.022  -1.51 
1990 0.902  0.930 -0.028  -2.61 -0.026  -1.78 
1991 0.867  0.902 -0.036  -2.82  -0.033  -2.10 
1992 0.831  0.870 -0.038  -2.71  -0.036  -2.13 
1993 0.777  0.812 -0.035  -2.17 -0.033  -1.77 
1994 0.792  0.813 -0.021  -1.33  -0.019  -1.04 
1995 0.779  0.809 -0.030  -1.86  -0.028  -1.50 
1996 0.771  0.813 -0.042  -2.62  -0.040  -2.15 
1997 0.760  0.808 -0.048  -2.93  -0.046  -2.45 
1998 0.776  0.814 -0.038  -2.41  -0.036  -1.96 
1999 0.778  0.815 -0.037  -2.33 -0.035  -1.89 
 
 
Table 10 Estimated average effect of displacement on the employment probability for workers aged 
41-50.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 1.000  1.000 0.000  .  0.000  0.00 
1987 0.889  0.984 -0.095  -10.01  -0.095  -7.52 
1988 0.932  0.973 -0.041  -4.70  -0.041  -3.36 
1989 0.928  0.960 -0.032  -3.40  -0.032  -2.54 
1990 0.920  0.938 -0.019 -1.77  -0.019  -1.40 
1991 0.877  0.917 -0.041  -3.24  -0.041  -2.78 
1992 0.830  0.887 -0.056  -3.95  -0.056  -3.52 
1993 0.776  0.837 -0.060  -3.70  -0.060  -3.41 
1994 0.768  0.826 -0.059  -3.54  -0.059  -3.25 
1995 0.768  0.812 -0.044  -2.60  -0.044  -2.37 
1996 0.737  0.794 -0.057  -3.27  -0.057  -3.02 
1997 0.708  0.764 -0.056  -3.08  -0.056  -2.87 
1998 0.689  0.728 -0.039  -2.08 -0.039  -1.93 
1999 0.652  0.694 -0.042  -2.17  -0.042  -2.03 
 
  29Table 11 Estimated average effect of displacement on the employment probability for workers aged 
20-50. The estimates are based on the results of the estimations stratified by age categories. 
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 1.000  1.000 0.000  .  -0.006  -0.85 
1987 0.878  0.949 -0.071  -11.81  -0.076  -9.09 
1988 0.900  0.944 -0.045  -7.73  -0.050  -6.02 
1989 0.916  0.932 -0.016  -2.82  -0.022  -2.61 
1990 0.899  0.924 -0.025  -4.07  -0.031  -3.50 
1991 0.860  0.896 -0.036  -5.05  -0.042  -4.49 
1992 0.819  0.859 -0.040  -5.02  -0.046  -4.61 
1993 0.757  0.794 -0.037  -4.05  -0.043  -3.94 
1994 0.769  0.805 -0.036  -4.00  -0.041  -3.88 
1995 0.772  0.802 -0.030  -3.36  -0.036  -3.33 
1996 0.765  0.800 -0.035  -3.85  -0.040  -3.73 
1997 0.753  0.793 -0.040  -4.30  -0.045  -4.15 
1998 0.762  0.798 -0.037  -4.07  -0.042  -3.91 
1999 0.754  0.786 -0.032  -3.53  -0.038  -3.49 
 
 
Table 12 Estimated average effect of displacement on the unemployment probability for workers aged 
20-30.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 0.217  0.203 0.014 1.04  0.013  1.01 
1987 0.267  0.195 0.072  5.10  0.071  4.37 
1988 0.207  0.183 0.024 1.80  0.023  1.39 
1989 0.160  0.154 0.006 0.50  0.005  0.32 
1990 0.139  0.127 0.012 1.07  0.011  0.70 
1991 0.175  0.159 0.015 1.21  0.014  0.85 
1992 0.242  0.226 0.017 1.17  0.016  0.87 
1993 0.288  0.257 0.031  2.06 0.030  1.60 
1994 0.282  0.264 0.019 1.25  0.018  0.94 
1995 0.277  0.252 0.026 1.71  0.025  1.31 
1996 0.253  0.244 0.010 0.66  0.009  0.47 
1997 0.256  0.238 0.018 1.22  0.017  0.92 
1998 0.232  0.217 0.015 1.08  0.014  0.79 
1999 0.216  0.197 0.019 1.38  0.018  1.00 
 
 
Table 13 Estimated average effect of displacement on the unemployment probability for workers aged 
31-40.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 0.153  0.109 0.044  3.33  0.038  2.87 
1987 0.241  0.092 0.149  10.35  0.143  8.49 
1988 0.205  0.087 0.118  8.57  0.112  6.69 
1989 0.137  0.088 0.049  3.96  0.044  2.69 
1990 0.112  0.077 0.035  3.02 0.029  1.81 
1991 0.141  0.104 0.037  2.84 0.031  1.79 
1992 0.202  0.153 0.049  3.24  0.044  2.30 
1993 0.241  0.206 0.035  2.10 0.029  1.45 
1994 0.254  0.191 0.062  3.78  0.057  2.83 
1995 0.242  0.176 0.065  4.04  0.060  2.97 
1996 0.223  0.172 0.052  3.26  0.046  2.31 
1997 0.220  0.173 0.048  3.04  0.042  2.14 
1998 0.200  0.167 0.033  2.17 0.028  1.41 
1999 0.183  0.161 0.022 1.45  0.016  0.83 
 
 
  30Table 14 Estimated average effect of displacement on the unemployment probability for workers aged 
41-50.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 0.088  0.082 0.006 0.55  -0.002  -0.21 
1987 0.220  0.071 0.149  10.69  0.140  9.08 
1988 0.163  0.060 0.102  8.16  0.094  6.40 
1989 0.092  0.049 0.044  4.27  0.035  2.55 
1990 0.096  0.043 0.053  5.15  0.045  3.16 
1991 0.091  0.067 0.024  2.12 0.015  1.00 
1992 0.133  0.104 0.029  2.19 0.020  1.24 
1993 0.181  0.147 0.034  2.27 0.026  1.45 
1994 0.194  0.149 0.045  2.95  0.037  2.04 
1995 0.186  0.131 0.055  3.68  0.046  2.58 
1996 0.173  0.131 0.041  2.83 0.033  1.87 
1997 0.178  0.147 0.031  2.02 0.022  1.21 
1998 0.168  0.151 0.017 1.15  0.009  0.48 
1999 0.162  0.151 0.011 0.74  0.002  0.13 
 
 
Table 15 Estimated average effect of displacement on the unemployment probability for workers aged 
20-50.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 0.162  0.141 0.021  2.73  0.016  2.18 
1987 0.246  0.130 0.116  13.97  0.112  11.72 
1988 0.194  0.120 0.074  9.43  0.069  7.27 
1989 0.134  0.105 0.030  4.20  0.025  2.71 
1990 0.119  0.089 0.030  4.60  0.026  2.82 
1991 0.141  0.117 0.024  3.30  0.020  2.01 
1992 0.200  0.170 0.030  3.54  0.025  2.40 
1993 0.244  0.211 0.033  3.63  0.029  2.57 
1994 0.249  0.210 0.039  4.29  0.035  3.09 
1995 0.241  0.196 0.046  5.07  0.041  3.68 
1996 0.222  0.191 0.031  3.52  0.026  2.42 
1997 0.224  0.193 0.030  3.43  0.026  2.35 
1998 0.205  0.184 0.021  2.47 0.017  1.54 
1999 0.191  0.174 0.018  2.09 0.013  1.21 
  
 
Table 16 Estimated average effect of displacement on the probability of being out of the labour force 
for workers aged 20-30.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 0.000  0.000 0.000  . -0.001  -0.13 
1987 0.016  0.007 0.009  2.55 0.009  1.64 
1988 0.026  0.012 0.014  3.00  0.013  2.21 
1989 0.031  0.021 0.010  1.96 0.010  1.50 
1990 0.038  0.025 0.014  2.38 0.013  1.89 
1991 0.047  0.030 0.017  2.61  0.016  2.16 
1992 0.056  0.038 0.019  2.58  0.018  2.20 
1993 0.057  0.053 0.004 0.53  0.004  0.42 
1994 0.062  0.057 0.005 0.65  0.005  0.53 
1995 0.061  0.047 0.014 1.88  0.014  1.63 
1996 0.062  0.046 0.015  2.01 0.015  1.74 
1997 0.065  0.051 0.014 1.74  0.013  1.51 
1998 0.062  0.049 0.013 1.72  0.013  1.48 
1999 0.072  0.055 0.017  2.12 0.017  1.87 
 
 
 
  31Table 17 Estimated average effect of displacement on the probability of being out of the labour force 
for workers aged 31-40.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 0.000  0.000 0.000  .  0.004  0.78 
1987 0.014  0.010 0.004 0.86  0.007  1.19 
1988 0.023  0.015 0.008 1.53  0.012  1.73 
1989 0.030  0.018 0.012 1.93  0.015  2.05 
1990 0.044  0.025 0.019  2.63  0.023  2.69 
1991 0.049  0.035 0.014 1.78  0.017  1.97 
1992 0.052  0.047 0.004 0.51  0.008  0.82 
1993 0.062  0.060 0.002 0.15  0.005  0.49 
1994 0.056  0.073 -0.017  -1.74  -0.013  -1.23 
1995 0.069  0.072 -0.003  -0.29  0.001  0.07 
1996 0.077  0.070 0.007 0.71  0.011  0.98 
1997 0.083  0.078 0.005 0.48  0.009  0.75 
1998 0.094  0.091 0.003 0.25  0.007  0.54 
1999 0.106  0.099 0.007 0.61  0.011  0.86 
 
 
Table 18 Estimated average effect of displacement on the probability of being out of the labour force 
for workers aged 41-50.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 0.000  0.000 0.000  .  0.000  0.00 
1987 0.011  0.002 0.009  2.61 0.009  1.66 
1988 0.024  0.007 0.016  3.27  0.016  2.55 
1989 0.041  0.020 0.021  3.00  0.021  2.62 
1990 0.049  0.027 0.022  2.75  0.022  2.46 
1991 0.060  0.042 0.018 1.96  0.018  1.79 
1992 0.078  0.048 0.031  3.04  0.031  2.80 
1993 0.095  0.067 0.028  2.48  0.028  2.33 
1994 0.110  0.079 0.031  2.51  0.031  2.38 
1995 0.111  0.099 0.013 0.97  0.013  0.93 
1996 0.131  0.106 0.025 1.85  0.025  1.76 
1997 0.153  0.119 0.034  2.35  0.034  2.25 
1998 0.169  0.146 0.023 1.49  0.023  1.44 
1999 0.203  0.170 0.033  2.02 0.033  1.96 
 
 
Table 19 Estimated average effect of displacement on the probability of being out of the labour force 
for workers aged 20-50.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t  ∆
DID  t 
1986 0.000  0.000 0.000  .  0.001  0.35 
1987 0.014  0.007 0.007  3.38  0.008  2.55 
1988 0.024  0.011 0.013  4.48  0.014  3.70 
1989 0.033  0.020 0.014  3.98  0.015  3.48 
1990 0.043  0.026 0.018  4.45  0.018  4.01 
1991 0.051  0.035 0.016  3.70  0.017  3.43 
1992 0.061  0.043 0.018  3.62  0.018  3.40 
1993 0.069  0.059 0.010 1.87  0.011  1.86 
1994 0.073  0.068 0.006 1.02  0.006  1.08 
1995 0.077  0.069 0.009 1.54  0.010  1.55 
1996 0.086  0.070 0.016  2.68  0.017  2.63 
1997 0.095  0.078 0.017  2.73  0.018  2.67 
1998 0.101  0.089 0.013  2.02  0.014  2.01 
1999 0.119  0.100 0.019  2.78  0.020  2.75 
 
 
  32Table 20 Estimated average effect of displacement on number of registered unemployment days for 
workers aged 20-30.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t 
1992 50.10  46.61  3.49  1.00 
1993 64.58  58.18  6.41  1.63 
1994 61.48  55.46  6.02  1.58 
1995 62.88  54.06  8.82  2.30 
1996 55.98  55.26  0.72  0.19 
1997 51.06  49.41  1.66  0.46 
1998 43.02  37.82  5.20  1.63 
1999 38.50  34.07  4.43  1.41 
 
 
Table 21 Estimated average effect of displacement on number of registered unemployment days for 
workers aged 31-40.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t 
1992 50.91  33.12 17.79  4.51 
1993 61.21  44.73 16.49  3.66 
1994 62.23  46.49 15.74  3.51 
1995 61.00  46.94 14.07  3.05 
1996 61.27  43.54 17.73  3.85 
1997 57.13  40.74 16.39  3.71 
1998 48.73  35.27 13.46  3.28 
1999 45.02  33.57 11.46  2.91 
 
 
Table 22 Estimated average effect of displacement on number of registered unemployment days for 
workers aged 41-50.  
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t 
1992 32.29  19.66 12.63  3.90 
1993 44.49  32.88 11.61  2.86 
1994 50.76  35.74 15.02  3.47 
1995 49.37  35.30 14.07  3.24 
1996 47.86  36.96 10.90  2.48 
1997 43.17  37.17  6.00  1.42 
1998 38.97  31.59  7.38  1.83 
1999 39.12  34.73  4.39  1.06 
 
 
Table 23 Estimated average effect of displacement on number of registered unemployment days for 
workers aged 20-30. The figures are calculated from the samples stratified by age categories. 
Year  E[YD=1]   E[YD=0]  ∆
D  t 
1992 45.40  35.10 10.31  4.93 
1993 58.00  47.13 10.87  4.49 
1994 58.73  47.30 11.43  4.73 
1995 58.57  46.72 11.84  4.84 
1996 55.31  46.67  8.64  3.54 
1997 50.69  43.42  7.27  3.12 
1998 43.61  35.33  8.28  3.87 
1999 40.62  34.10  6.52  3.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  33Table 24 Unemployment differential (ratio) by incidence and days per year 
Age 20-30  Age 31-40  Age 41-50 
Year  ∆t(U)  ∆t(U|U>0)  ∆t(Pr(U>0))  ∆t(U) ∆t(U|U>0) ∆t(Pr(U>0))  ∆t(U) ∆t(U|U>0)  ∆t(Pr(U>0))
1992  1.07  0.97 1.11  1.54 1.13 1.36  1.64 1.14 1.45 
1993  1.11  1.04 1.07  1.37 1.10 1.24  1.35 1.00 1.36 
1994  1.11  1.10 1.01  1.34 1.06 1.26  1.42 0.98 1.44 
1995  1.16  1.05 1.11  1.30 1.05 1.24  1.40 1.00 1.40 
1996  1.01  0.97 1.04  1.41 1.08 1.30  1.30 1.01 1.28 
1997  1.03  0.97 1.06  1.40 1.10 1.27  1.16 0.96 1.21 
1998  1.14  1.05 1.08  1.38 1.11 1.24  1.23 1.07 1.15 
1999  1.13  1.00 1.13  1.34 1.09 1.23  1.13 1.01 1.12 
 
 
E Figures  
 
Figure 1: The employment and unemployment rate in Sweden, 1975-2001. 
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Figure 2 Estimated average effect (∆
DID) of displacement on the probability of being employed,(in 
November) unemployed or out of the labour force. The estimates are based on the results of the 
estimations stratified by age categories. Dots denote estimates significant at 5 percent level. 
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  34 
Figure 3 Estimated average effect (∆
DID) of dis-
placement on employment (in November) prob-
ability by age category. Dots denote estimates 
significant at 5 percent level. 
Figure 4 Estimated average effect (∆
DID) of dis-
placement on unemployment probability by age 
category. Dots denote estimates significant at 5 
percent level. 
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Figure 5 Estimated average effect (∆
DID) of dis-
placement on the probability of being out of the 
labour force, by age category. Dots denote esti-
mates significant at 5 percent level. 
Figure 6 Estimated average effect (∆
D) of dis-
placement on annual number of registered un-
employment days. Dots denote estimates signi-
ficant at 5 percent level. 
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